Defense forces: Wind farms reduce Estonia’s defense capacity 

Wind farms reduce Estonia’s defense capability as they can shorten the early warning time, make it harder to acquire intelligence data and use weapon systems, say high-ranking commanders.

Earlier this month, the Swedish government said that it will no longer issue licenses for the construction and operation of offshore wind farms around its coast. The Swedish Armed Forces have said offshore wind disrupts sensors and radars, among other things, and thus damages the country’s defense capabilities.

Officials from the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) and Ministry of Climate said they were not expecting to take the same steps.

But now, head of the Defense Intelligence Center Col. Ants Kiviselg and Commander of the Navy Crde. Ivo Värk told ERR that the situation is different. Wind farm developments on land and at sea can reduce Estonia’s defense capacity.

Kiviselg said that the overall impact of wind farms is negative for the defense forces. He explained that they disrupt radio intelligence, complicate the reception and positioning of signals from enemy territory and ultimately shorten early warning times – which are critical in the event of an enemy attack. In addition to weakening Estonia’s defense capabilities, the impact of wind farms also affects NATO’s broader defense capacity, the colonel emphasized.

What impact do planned and existing wind farms have on the Estonian Defense Forces?

The impact of wind farms on the EDF is generally negative. Construction restriction zones have been established, clearly delineating where wind farms can be built and under what conditions. These restrictions exist because wind farms interfere with the reception, detection, analysis and positioning of radio signals.

When we talk about early warning capability, we are specifically referring to our ability to detect potential hostile objects or targets on the other side of the border and to take preventive countermeasures. Building wind farms in construction restriction zones would undoubtedly hinder our ability to ensure early warning, limiting the tools and systems we currently have in place for this purpose.

From a technical perspective, the construction of wind farms introduces specific challenges. First and foremost, signals reflecting off the moving and stationary blades of wind turbines create so-called false signals, making it impossible to determine or position the origin of the actual signal. Unfortunately, this issue does not only affect early warning capabilities but also impacts the Navy’s mission to ensure rescue capabilities at sea. As a result, locating objects at sea becomes more difficult.

How are they affecting us already? We already have radar stations and signal intelligence, don’t we? Do they not work because of the wind turbines?

In signal intelligence, we use a concept called the signal-to-noise ratio. Essentially, we operate in an environment where artificial noise sources already exist on a daily basis – such as television transmission outputs or other urban noise – and we need to identify the signals of interest within that noise.

If wind turbines are built nearby, they introduce additional interference. We can say that the modern environment already impacts our reception capabilities, and if we add more solar or wind energy farms, the noise level will increase significantly, further reducing our ability to receive signals effectively. This is precisely why restriction zones have been established, where wind farms should not be built.

We are currently reviewing the existing regulation in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense to clarify potential restriction zones. This applies to wind farms both offshore and on land, as well as the construction of solar farms.

Are wind farms already interfering and do you need to move some radars, for example?

We have developed compensation measures in collaboration with the Ministry of Defense and some private sector service providers. Specifically, in terms of intelligence and early warning capabilities, new positions are being established to mitigate the impact that already-built wind farms have on our reception capabilities. One example is the Aidu Wind Farm, which was constructed within a restricted construction zone under the current regulation. In response, we are implementing compensation measures to enhance our signal intelligence capabilities and reduce the negative effects.

When will these measures take effect and what will happen in the meantime?

I obviously cannot discuss specific timelines. What I can say is that the preparation of these stations is underway and the compensation measures will be operational as soon as possible. However, they are not yet functional today.

So what do we not see or hear today?

I cannot go into specifics about what we fail to detect, but I can say that our reception capability – specifically the distance at which we can detect, intercept and position potential adversary signals – has diminished. This is due to the worsening signal-to-noise ratio from our perspective. As a result, our early warning capability is already somewhat weaker today than it was five or ten years ago.

Could you provide an example of what such a situation prevents us from doing? We have seen cases where air traffic has been disrupted – for instance, when a Finnish aircraft had to turn around. Is it possible to give an example of something that isn’t working right now or something we fail to detect?

At worst, this will certainly affect our early warning time. For example, consider drone attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure or military targets in Russia. Recently, there was an incident where a drone launched against a Ukrainian target ended up unintentionally crossing into Latvian territory.

With wind farms that reduce our reception capability, early warning times become shorter. This means that a drone not intended for a target in Estonia could accidentally cross our borders, and detecting such a drone would be more difficult.

Or if we talk about the worst-case scenario – such as a potential military attack against Estonia – shortened early warning times could have critical implications. For instance, early warning for launched missiles – whether Iskander missiles or missiles launched from aircraft – could be reduced if we fail to detect the takeoff of an aircraft or its pre-launch maneuvers. Here, we are talking about minutes or even tens of minutes of reduced warning time.

If we look at the flight time of a Geran-type drone launched from Luga toward Tallinn, it would be less than an hour. Ballistic missiles would arrive in just a few minutes, while air-launched missiles would take tens of minutes. In such a worst-case scenario, early warning times would be significantly shortened, limiting the ability to respond effectively.

What is the effect of the planned wind turbines on the Gulf of Livonia and the sea near Saaremaa?

I think the best person to answer this question is Commander of the Navy, Cdre. Ivo Värk.

The Swedes have approved the construction of only one out of 14 planned wind farms in their waters. To what extent do the wind farms we are planning affect not only us but also our neighbors?

When we talk about early warning and defense capabilities, we are not only discussing Estonia’s early warning but also NATO’s early warning. In this sense, we need to take a broader view. Considering the geographical positions of Estonia and Sweden, the early warning time for Sweden, when assessing threats from Russia, is significantly longer than it is for Estonia. If the Swedes have identified a security risk in this context, we must take it seriously. Of course, the specific details behind Sweden’s decisions should be addressed to them directly.

Why did you even allow wind farms to be built in that prohibited area, which are already shortening the warning time? You could have raised this issue sooner!

This discussion has been ongoing for quite some time. The Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority (TTJA) halted the construction of the Aidu Wind Farm, and later agreements were made between various ministries and developers allowing the wind farm to be built. From the perspective of the Intelligence Center, as the Defense Forces’ representative, we have consistently expressed our position. We have stated that this wind farm interferes with our reception capabilities, and until compensation measures are fully implemented, our early warning time will remain reduced.

This is also one of the reasons I am giving this interview today – the security environment around us has not improved in any way; in fact, we have seen it deteriorate in recent years. Therefore, it is crucial for us to ensure early warning capabilities, both for Estonia’s independent defense and for NATO’s collective defense and early warning systems.

How much will the incoming radars impact the situation? Is it possible to compensate for this with mobile radars?

Certainly, mobile radars can help compensate for this situation, but I would leave a detailed response to the experts, likely from the Air Force or, in the case of maritime surveillance radars, the Navy commander.

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Commodore Värk pointed out that, in addition to the reduction of surveillance capabilities, offshore wind farms can also have a negative impact on the use of anti-ship missiles that have recently entered Estonia’s arsenal.
Ivo Värk. Source: Karl Alfred Baumeister/mil.ee

How do wind farms affect the Navy?

Offshore wind farms significantly impact the operation of maritime surveillance systems. This does not only affect coastal maritime surveillance radars but also passive monitoring systems and electronic intelligence systems, including acoustic systems and, in fact, the use of weapons at sea.

Which wind farms affect you? There have been discussions about building offshore wind farms in the Gulf of Livonia and on the west coast of Saaremaa. Recently it was said they would not interfere with defense. What is the truth?

All wind farms planned in Estonian waters – whether in territorial waters or the exclusive economic zone – disrupt our operations to varying degrees. It is important to understand that this is not about one or two turbines at sea. For example, if we look at the offshore wind farm area west of Saaremaa, it spans 50 kilometers from north to south and 20 to 50 kilometers from east to west – a massive area with a significant number of turbines. Essentially, we are building a fence or barrier, behind which we simply cannot see.

Do they affect the use of anti-ship missiles too?

Yes, this is directly related to the use of these systems. For instance, the anti-ship missiles we use today are operated from land, and offshore wind farms impose significant limitations on their effectiveness.

I can say that everything Sweden has pointed out is entirely valid. I understand our colleagues’ concerns. Since our operating environment, naval warfare doctrine and even the adversary – or threat – are similar, I fully share their view that offshore wind farms pose a security risk.